Three Essays on Incentive Design by Large, Jordan James
Three Essays on Incentive Design
Submitted by Jordan James Large, to the University of Exeter as a thesis for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics, April 2013.
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is
copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without
proper acknowledgement.
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has
been identied and that no material has previously been submitted and approved
for the award of a degree by this or any other University.
Signature:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor, Doctor Surajeet Chakravarty.
Without his guidance and persistent help this thesis would not have been possible. I
would also like to thank both Professor Tigran Melkonyan and Professor Robin Mason
for their useful discussions that helped shape the workings of two of the chapters to
follow. I am indebted to the ESRC for providing the nancial support necessary to
pursue this venture. I also o¤er sincere gratitude to my colleagues and seminar
participants at the University of Exeter Business School whose insight and criticism
was utterly invaluable. Finally, it gives me great pleasure in acknowledging the help of
my loving family and friends. In particular Agathe, whose support and patience gave
me the strength when I needed it most.
2
Three Essays on Incentive Design
Abstract
We present three distinct works on the subject of incentive design. The rst focuses
on a fundamental aspect of all principal-agent models, the participation constraint. We
endogenise the constraint, allowing the agent to inuence his outside option, albeit at
some detriment to the project he is contracted to work upon. We compare the optimal
contract to the literature on the supposed trade-o¤ between risk and incentives. We
nd support for the Prendergast (2002) observation of a positive relationship between
the two variables and o¤er an explanation through the use of said inuence activities.
The second contribution introduces another principal-agent framework for models with
both adverse selection and moral hazard, with the novel inclusion of limited liability.
Described in a target-setting environment, the ndings are related to and support the
use of tenure contracts in academia. This is justied by the fact that pooling equilibria
maximise the value to the principal and fully separating equilibria are implemented
with non-monotonic wage structures. Finally, in opposition to conventional literature,
those of low type make rent gains over and above their reservation utility, while the
high types break even. The nal chapter studies organisational design and allocation of
control. We o¤er conditions whereby rms would wish to integrate, or prot-share, with
another, given varying degrees of control allocation. We show that integration comes
at a lower cost for the decision-making rm when control is contractible as opposed to
transferable. Also we show that the level of incompatibility between rms, unrelated
to nancial gain, can a¤ect the integration decision.
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